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I. INTRODUCTION
In the digital sex world, “roses” means dollars and “greek” refers to
anal sex.1 Advertisements such as these run rampant: “15 Min $50 Roses
. . . 1 hour $150 Roses,” and “How About A G-R-E-E-K Lesson I’m a
Great Student!!”2 Other advertisements do not use code words: “HELLO
GENETLEMEN NOW YOU MEET JADE AND TIPHANY WE DO
TWO GIRL SHOWS AND INDIVISUAL CALLS!! WE GUARANTEE
THE TIME OF YOUR LIFE!!!”3 These are the types of advertisements
that Sheriff Thomas Dart of the Chicago Police Department frequently
encountered when scrolling through the “Erotic Services” portion of the
popular website, Craigslist.com (hereinafter “Craigslist”).4 Despite these
shocking sex solicitations, a federal court in Illinois recently held that
Craigslist was immune from suit despite allowing these advertisements
on its website.5 How can such a blatant promise for sex be permitted
through the Internet? The answer lies with the Communications Decency
Act (hereinafter “CDA”).6
Congress enacted the CDA to help promote the growth of the
Internet and to encourage Web sites to self-police their content.7 With
the intention of enforcing these policy goals, courts have extended the
statutory immunity of the CDA immensely, creating what one court has
called a “lawless no-man’s-land on the Internet.”8 The underlying
purpose of these policy goals and the language of the statute, however,
were not meant to immunize Web sites from engaging in illegal behavior
or facilitating others in engaging in such behavior.9
When Congress passed the CDA in 1996, the state of the Internet
was significantly different than it is now.10 Over the past decade, the
1

Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 961, 962–63 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
Id.
3
Id. (spelling errors in original).
4
Id.
5
Id. at 966–69..
6
47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (2009).
7
Id.; see also Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027–28 (9th Cir. 2003); Zeran v.
Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330–31, 333 (4th Cir. 1997); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992
F. Supp. 44, 52 (D.D.C. 1998); 141 CONG. REC. H8469–70 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995)
(statements of Rep. Cox, Wyden, and Barton).
8
Fair Hous. Council v. Roommate.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008)
(en banc).
9
Id.
10
Id. at 1164, n.15 (“The Internet is no longer a fragile new means of communication
that could easily be smothered in the cradle by overzealous enforcement of laws and
regulations applicable to brick-and-mortar businesses. Rather, it has become a dominant
– perhaps the preeminent – means through which commerce is conducted. And its vast
reach into the lives of millions is exactly why we must be careful not to exceed the scope
of the immunity provided by Congress and thus give online businesses an unfair
2
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Internet has flourished to a point where such a broad concept of
immunity under the CDA is not as imperative as it was in the Internet’s
early stages.11 It is therefore appropriate to reconsider the overwhelming
sweep of immunity granted toWeb sites by previous courts.
Two recent cases demonstrate how courts have applied this
seemingly limitless concept of immunity: Doe v. SexSearch.com
(hereinafter “SexSearch”)12 and Dart v. Craigslist, Inc. (hereinafter
“Dart”).13 Both of these cases arose from an “adult” website or an
“adult” section of a website. Each of these cases had egregious facts and
claims. The harsh result—denying the injured parties relief against these
Web sites—is hard to justify given the general policy concerns regarding
sexual crimes involving minors and prostitution.14
These cases
demonstrate the need for a more factually intensive inquiry before
immunity is granted.
Part II of this Note sets forth the legislative background of the
CDA, including the language of the statute and the policy reasons for
enacting it. This part examines the first case to interpret the CDA’s §
230 immunity, Zeran v. America Online (hereinafter “Zeran”),15 and
analyzes how courts have construed and expanded that decision. Part III
discusses the facts and holdings of the two cases central to this note:
SexSearch and Dart. These cases demonstrate the harsh results that flow
from granting broad immunity without consideration for the facts and
circumstances of the case. Part IV analyzes Fair Housing Council v.
Roommate.com, LLC (hereinafter “Roommate”) and explores how the
court delved into a deeper factual analysis in that case rather than blindly
granting the Web site blanket immunity for its actions.16
Finally, Part V articulates a new test, which courts should consider
when determining whether CDA immunity is appropriate. The principles
announced in Roommate seek to limit the breadth of immunity available
and thus present a step in the right direction; however, these principles
need to be expanded to allow courts to intervene and preclude immunity
advantage over their real-world counterparts, which must comply with laws of general
applicability.”).
11
Id.
12
502 F. Supp. 2d 719 (N.D. Ohio 2007), aff’d on other grounds, 551 F.3d 412 (6th
Cir. 2008).
13
No. 09-C1385, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97596 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 20, 2009).
14
See Jessica S. Groppe, Comment, A Child’s Playground or a Predator’s Hunting
Ground? – How to Protect Children on Internet Social Networking Sites, 16 COMMLAW
CONSPECTUS 215, 217–24 (2007) (arguing that curbing sexual solicitation of minors on
the Internet is a high priority).
15
129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
16
Fair Hous. Council v. Roommate.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (en
banc).

354

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 6:351

when necessary. The best way to effectuate Congress’s intent in passing
the CDA is to conduct a fact-specific inquiry, in which the court
considers the nature of the Web site at issue, the underlying facts of the
case, and the claims brought by the plaintiff.
II. THE BACKGROUND OF THE CDA
A. Legislative Background
Congress passed the CDA as an amendment to the
Telecommunications Act of 1996.17 The Telecommunications Act of
1996 was passed “to promote competition and reduce regulation in order
to secure lower prices and higher quality services for American
telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of
new telecommunications technologies.”18 The CDA was therefore one
small piece of a much larger statute. The portion of the statute referred to
as the CDA is entitled, “Protection for Private Blocking and Screening of
Offensive Material.”19 Under this title, the CDA states, “no provider or
user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or
speaker of any information provided by another information content
provider.”20
The CDA provides immunity when three specific
requirements are met.21
First, the defendant must be a “provider or user of an interactive
computer service.”22 An interactive computer service is defined as “any
information service, system, or access software provider that provides or
enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server,
including specifically a service or system that provides access to the
Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or
educational institutions.”23 The most common interactive computer
services are Web sites because they provide a service that enables
multiple users to access the service.24 Therefore, this requirement is
generally easily met.25

17

47 U.S.C. § 609 (2009).
Id.
19
47 U.S.C. § 230 (2009).
20
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2009).
21
Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 418 (1st Cir. 2007).
22
Id.
23
47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2).
24
Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162, n.6 (9th Cir.
2008) (en banc).
25
Id. The Web sites at issue in this note, SexSearch.com, Craigslist.com, and
Roommate.com, are all information content providers.
18
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Second, the claim must be based on “information provided by
another information content provider.”26 An information content
provider is defined as “any person or entity that is responsible, in whole
or in part, for the creation or development of information provided
through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.”27 In any
given situation, there may be more than one information content
provider.28 Users of the Web site and the Web sites themselves can both
Thus, a Web site may
be information content providers.29
simultaneously be an interactive computer service provider when it
passively displays information, and an information content provider
when it creates or develops content.30 Whenever a Web site acts as an
information content provider, it subjects itself to liability for the
information that it created or developed.31
Finally, the claim must treat the defendant “as [a] publisher or
speaker” of that information even though it was provided by an outside
“information content provider.”32 On its face the CDA does not define
the terms “publisher” and “speaker.”33 However, subsequent courts have
read the terms as requiring that the claim must treat the defendant as if he
were the one who created or presented the information.34
The CDA was passed with two primary objectives: Congress
wanted to encourage the growth of the Internet through fostering free
speech and removing the potentially stifling liability in this area,35 and
Congress wanted to “encourage interactive computer services and users
of such services to self-police the Internet for obscenity and other
offensive material. . . .”36 Congress’s specific findings and policy
objectives are listed within the statute to make its intent clear to the
26

Universal Commc’n. Sys., 478 F.3d at 418.
47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3).
28
See Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1165.
29
Id. (“The fact that users are information content providers does not preclude
Roommate from also being an information content provider by helping ‘develop’ at least
‘in part’ the information in the profiles. . . [T]he party responsible for putting information
online may be subject to liability, even if the information originated with a user.”); see
also Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1033 (9th Cir. 2003).
30
Id. at 1162–63; see also Anthony v. Yahoo! Inc., 421 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1262–63
(N.D. Cal. 2006).
31
Id.
32
Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 418 (1st Cir. 2007).
33
See generally, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), (f).
34
See, e.g., Universal Commc’n Sys., 478 F.3d at 421–22.
35
See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1), (2); Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1027; Zeran v. Am.
Online, Inc., 129 F. 3d 327, 330–31 (4th Cir. 1997).
36
Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1028; see also 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4); Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331;
Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 52 (D.D.C. 1998); 141 CONG. REC. H8469–70
(daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statements of Rep. Cox, Wyden, and Barton).
27
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courts.37 The impetus to propose CDA immunity also came from two
court cases that illustrated the disparity of treatment of interactive
computer services under common law principles.38 Under common law,
interactive computer services can be treated as either publishers or
distributors when they supply third-party content to their users.39 The
distinguishing factor between being considered a publisher or a
distributor is the amount of control that the service has over the content
that it publishes.40 A publisher is responsible for the creation and editing
of its publication and is thus responsible for the content of its work.41 A
distributor, on the other hand, is only responsible for distributing material
and is thus not liable for the content of its publication unless it knew or
had reason to know of defamatory content.42 The most well-known
example of a distributor is a bookstore, because a bookstore does not
exert any control over the contents of the books that it sells.43
37
Congress’s findings include: “The rapidly developing array of Internet and other
interactive computer services available to individual Americans represent an
extraordinary advance in the availability of educational and informational resources to
our citizens.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(1); “[t]hese services offer users a great degree of
control over the information that they receive, as well as the potential for even greater
control in the future as technology develops.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(2); “[t]he Internet and
other interactive computer services offer a forum for a true diversity of political
discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues for
intellectual activity.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3); “[t]he Internet and other interactive
computer services have flourished, to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of
government regulation. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(4); “[i]ncreasingly Americans are relying on
interactive media for a variety of political, educational, cultural, and entertainment
services.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(5). Congress’s policy reasons behind the CDA include: “to
promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer
services and other interactive media.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1); “to preserve the vibrant and
competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive
computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2); “to
encourage the development of technologies which maximize user control over what
information is received by individuals, families, and schools who use the Internet and
other interactive computer services.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(3); “to remove disincentives for
the development and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that empower
parents to restrict their children’s access to objectionable or inappropriate online
material” 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4); “to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal
laws to deter and punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of
computer.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(5).
38
Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Stratton
Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995). See also, H.R. REP. NO. 104-458 (1996); Thomas D. Huycke,
Note, Licensed Anarchy: Anything Goes on the Internet? Revisiting the Boundaries of
Section 230 Protection, 111 W. VA. L. REV. 581, 583–86 (2009).
39
Huycke, supra note 37, at 583.
40
Id. at 583–84.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 140.
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In Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., Compuserve obtained
information from third parties, used the information to compile an
electronic rumor publication, and posted the publication on its bulletin
board.44 The publication contained defamatory statements about the
plaintiff, who then sued Compuserve for libel.45 The court held that
Compuserve was akin to a distributor, as opposed to a publisher, because
it did not review the contents of the publication before the publication
was uploaded.46 Therefore, since the plaintiff did not prove knowledge
or a reason to know of the defamatory content, Compuserve was not
found liable.47
The opposite conclusion was reached in Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v.
In Stratton, an
Prodigy Services Co. (hereinafter “Stratton”).48
investment banking firm sued a Web site based on defamatory statements
about the firm, which were posted on the Web site’s electronic bulletin
board.49 The court held that the Web site was a publisher because it
claimed to exercise “editorial control over the content of messages
posted on its computer bulletin boards[.]”50 Due to its status as a
publisher, the Web site was found liable.51
Read together, these decisions may be taken to establish that
interactive computer services will not be held liable if they do not police
their Web sites and do not know or have reason to know of tortious
activity, but they will be held liable if they do police their Web sites.52 In
effect, these decisions support the policy that Web sites should maintain
a “hands-off” approach and avoid ensuring the safety of their sites. In
order to set aside the deterrent to monitor one’s Web site, Congress
enacted the CDA to immunize interactive computer services from suits
based on information provided by third parties that have been published
by the Web site.53 In reference to Internet-based suits, Congress

44

Id. at 137.
Id. at 137–38.
46
Id. at 141.
47
Id.
48
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 229 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
49
Id. at *1, 4.
50
Id. at *3, 6–11.
51
Id. at *10–11.
52
Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 140–41 (S.D.N.Y. 1991);
Stratton Oakmont, 1995 N.Y. Misc LEXIS 229, at *6–11.
53
See H.R. REP. NO. 104–58 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (“[S]ection [230] provides ‘Good
Samaritan’ protections from civil liability for providers . . . of an interactive computer
service for actions to restrict . . . access to objectionable online material. One of the
specific purposes of this section is to overrule Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy and any other
similar decisions which have treated such providers . . . as publishers or speakers of
45
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abolished the difference between distributor and publisher liability found
at common law.54 Congress sought to allow interactive computer
services to perform some editing and policing of user-generated content
without holding them liable for all of the unlawful or defamatory
messages that they did not find and delete.55 Congress also sought to
protect the good faith removal of any material that was viewed as
“obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or
otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally
protected.”56 Therefore, although Congress sought to protect Web sites
engaging in an effort to cleanse their Web sites of illegal or inappropriate
material, there is no indication in the statute that Congress intended to
immunize Web sites that knew of illegal or defamatory material on their
Web sites and refused to remove the material.57
B. Zeran v. America Online
The Fourth Circuit in Zeran v. America Online presented the first
interpretation by an appellate court of the CDA.58 In this case, the
plaintiff, Zeran, sought to hold America Online (hereinafter “AOL”)
liable for defamatory messages posted on AOL’s bulletin board by an
unidentified third party.59 The postings advertised shirts with tasteless
slogans referencing the Oklahoma City bombing and told interested
parties to contact the plaintiff, Zeran, at his home phone number.60 As a
result of these messages, Zeran received multiple threatening phone calls
that intensified further when a local radio host talked about the
advertisements during his radio show.61 Zeran notified AOL about the
defamatory postings. Eventually, AOL took the postings down but
refused to post a retraction.62

content that is not their own because they have restricted access to objectionable
material.”).
54
Id.
55
See Fair Hous. Council v. Roommate.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir.
2008) (en banc) (“Congress sought to immunize the removal of user-generated content,
not the creation of the content.”) (emphasis in original).
56
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A).
57
See generally 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2009).
58
See Zeran, 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
59
Id. at 328.
60
Id. at 329.
61
Id. Zeran was a completely innocent victim of defamation, which resulted in an
exorbitant number of death threats. Even after the radio show and a local newspaper
revealed that the advertisements were a hoax, Zeran was still receiving fifteen outraged
phone calls per day. Id.
62
Id.
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The Fourth Circuit held that AOL was immune from suit even
though it was notified of the statements because AOL is an interactive
computer service, and the plaintiff sought to hold AOL liable as a
publisher for the postings provided by an outside information content
provider.63 Zeran argued that he was seeking to hold AOL liable for
being a distributor rather than a publisher, because AOL knew of the
defamatory postings.64 He supported his argument by stating that
Congress only meant to protect publishers under the CDA, based on the
language of the statute, and that the statute left distributors unprotected.65
The court held that the distinction between distributor liability and
publisher liability is immaterial because both are merely subsets of
publisher liability.66 The terms “publisher” and “distributor” derive their
meanings from defamation law.67 For purposes of defamation law, both
publishers and distributors are considered to be “publishers” because
they provide information to the public, regardless of their knowledge of
the material.68 The different nomenclature signifies only “the different
standards of liability [that] may be applied within the larger publisher
category, depending on the specific type of publisher concerned.”69 The
court reasoned that once a website receives notice of a potentially
defamatory posting, the Web site assumes the role of a traditional
publisher.70 Thus, the court held, “lawsuits seeking to hold a service
provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial
functions—such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or
alter content—are barred.”71
Since the decision in Zeran, many courts throughout the country
have used the case’s analysis to advance a broad interpretation of
immunity.72 Some courts have granted immunity to defendants even if
they take an active role in selecting and posting defamatory material, as
long as someone else wrote the original material.73 This broad
63

Id. at 332–33.
Id. at 331.
65
Zeran, 129 F. 3d at 331–32.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 332.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 332.
71
Zeran, 129 F. 3d at 330. The Zeran court’s holding that publishers and distributors
should both be considered publishers under the CDA was upheld in Barrett v. Rosenthal
146 P.3d 510 at 518–20 (Cal. 2006).
72
See Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 461
F. Supp. 2d 681, 690 n.7 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (listing cases that have stated that Section
230(c)(1) offers information computer services a “broad,” and “robust” immunity).
73
See, e.g., Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003); Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146
P.3d 510 (Cal. 2006).
64
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interpretation can partially be attributed to the Zeran court’s
characterization of publisher liability.74 The conflation of the roles of
publisher and distributor is troubling given that the statutory language of
the CDA specifically uses the term “publisher,” to the exclusion of the
term “distributor.”75 The CDA states: “[n]o provider or user of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker
of any information. . . .” 76 Therefore, Congress arguably only meant to
grant immunity to Web sites when they are being treated as traditional
publishers, instead of being treated as either publishers or distributors.
Despite the overwhelming majority of courts advocating a broad
grant of immunity, some courts have recently taken the view that Zeran
has been applied too broadly.77 Many scholars argue that the breadth of
immunity has become too large and out of control.78 These courts and
scholars espouse taking a more comprehensive view of the entire case
before granting immunity for every kind of action regardless of how
active the interactive computer service is in the creation or development
of the material provided.

74

Zeran, 129 F. 3d at 330.
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2009).
76
Id. (emphasis added)
77
See Doe v. GTE, 347 F. 3d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 2003) (The Seventh Circuit stated
that § 230(c)(1) should be read as a “definitional clause rather than as an immunity from
liability . . . . The difference between this reading and [the courts that consider it to be a
clause granting immunity] is that § 230(c)(2) never requires ISPs (interactive service
providers) to filter offensive content, and thus § 230(e)(3) would not preempt state laws
or common-law doctrines that induce or require ISPs to protect the interests of third
parties, [] for such laws would not be ‘inconsistent with’ this understanding of §
230(c)(1).”); see also Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, 519 F. 3d at
669–70 (citing and agreeing with the proposition in Doe v. GTE that § 230(c)(1) was
meant to be a “definitional clause.”); Fair Hous. Council v. Roommate.com, LLC, 521
F.3d 1157, 1163–64 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (agreeing with the Seventh Circuit that the
interpretation of the substance of section 230(c) should be consistent with the title of the
section, “Protection of ‘good samaritan’ blocking and screening of offensive material”
and thus § 230(c)(1) should be considered a definitional clause.)
78
See, e.g., Huycke, supra note 37, at 596 (“[C]ourts analyzing Section 230 routinely
ignore Congress’s definition of an [information content provider] to find [interactive
computer services] immunized even if they alter, manipulate, select or facilitate third
party content, simply because the content originated with the third party.”); Katy Noeth,
Note, The Never-Ending Limits of § 230: Extending ISP Immunity to the Sexual
Exploitation of Children, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 765, 769 (2008) (“The end result is that
courts have expanded § 230 to immunize [interactive computer services] from virtually
every tort action.”).
75
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III. SEXSEARCH AND DART
A. Doe v. SexSearch
One instance of a court granting broad immunity to an undeserving
defendant is Doe v. SexSearch.79 In SexSearch, the Web site at issue
offers an adult dating service that encouraged its members to meet and
have sex.80 Plaintiff John Doe met Jane Roe on SexSearch’s Web site,
and pursuant to conversations and plans made through the Web site, the
two met at Roe’s home and engaged in sexual relations.81 Although Roe
represented herself to be eighteen years-old in her profile on the website,
she was in fact fourteen at the time of the meeting.82 As a result of the
sexual relations, Doe was arrested and charged with engaging in
unlawful conduct with a minor.83 Doe then sued SexSearch alleging
breach of contract, fraud, negligent infliction of emotional distress,
negligent misrepresentation, breach of warranty, violations of the Ohio
Consumer Sales Practices Act, and failure to warn.84 These claims
ultimately boiled down to whether “(a) [d]efendants failed to discover
Jane Roe lied about her age to join the website, or (b) the contract terms
[were] unconscionable.”85
In granting immunity, the court rejected plaintiff’s arguments that
SexSearch is an information content provider because the Web site
reserves the power to alter and delete the content of profiles that disobey
the profile guidelines.86 Furthermore, the court denied the argument that
CDA immunity can only be granted to defendants when faced with
defamation claims.87 The court held that SexSearch is an interactive
computer service and not an information content provider.88 In addition,
the court held that the suit brought by Doe sought to hold SexSearch
liable for acting as a publisher in publishing information provided by a
third party.89 The Court rejected Doe’s reliance on Anthony v. Yahoo!
Inc. (hereinafter “Anthony”)90 in determining that SexSearch is not an
79

Doe v. SexSearch, 502 F. Supp. 2d 719 (N.D. Ohio 2007).
Id.
SexSearch, 502 F. Supp. 2d at 722.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 723–24.
85
SexSearch, 502 F. Supp. 2d at 724.
86
Id. at 725–26.
87
Id. at 726.
88
Id. at 725–26.
89
Id. at 726–27.
90
421 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (N.D. Cal. 2006). In Anthony, the interactive computer
service at issue consisted of two dating services that were subsections of Yahoo! The
plaintiff alleged that Yahoo! produced false member profiles and that it distributed
80
81
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information content provider.91 The court distinguished Anthony because
in Anthony, the defendant Web site created the tortious content itself, but
in SexSearch, plaintiff did not allege that SexSearch created false
information or modified Jane Roe’s profile.92 The court further relied on
Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc. (hereinafter “Carafano”)93 and held
that despite the fact that SexSearch provided the questionnaire that Roe
answered falsely, that fact is not enough to prove that SexSearch is the
developer of the false profile.94
The court in SexSearch also relied on the reasoning from Doe v.
MySpace, (hereinafter “MySpace”),95 to grant immunity to SexSearch. In
MySpace, plaintiff Julie Roe sued MySpace, alleging the defendant
negligently failed to monitor its Web site.96 MySpace is a social
networking site that allows individuals to create profiles and
communicate with other users.97 Plaintiff Julie Doe met Peter Solis
through MySpace and the two exchanged contact information.98 Doe and
Solis arranged a meeting in person, during which Solis sexually assaulted
Doe.99 At the time of the meeting, Doe was fourteen years-old and Solis
was nineteen.100 Doe had created her MySpace profile and originally met
Solis when she was thirteen, in violation of MySpace’s minimum age
requirement.101 The court found that despite Doe’s claim that the Web
site negligently failed to keep minors off the website, Doe was really
seeking to hold MySpace responsible for publishing the content of her
profile, which led to her attack.102 Therefore, the court granted immunity
to MySpace.103 Relying on this reasoning, the court in SexSearch held
that Doe was seeking to hold SexSearch liable for failure to monitor its

former members’ profiles that had discontinued their service to its current members to
retain their service. Yahoo! was found to be liable for both the false profiles and the
former profiles. SexSearch distinguished the false profiles in Anthony from Roe’s profile,
but it did not consider the misrepresentations associated with the former profiles.
91
SexSearch, 502 F. Supp. 2d at 725.
92
Id.
93
339 F.3d 1119 (9th. Cir. 2003).
94
SexSearch, 502 F. Supp. 2d at 725–26.
95
474 F. Supp. 2d 843 (W.D. Tex. 2007), aff’d, 528 F.3d 413, 415–16 (5th Cir.
2008).
96
MySpace, 528 F.3d at 416.
97
Id. at 415.
98
Id. at 416.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
. Id.
102
Myspace, 528 F.3d at 419–20.
103
Id. at 420–22.
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website for the publication of third-party content and for failure to keep
minors off its website.104
The court’s reliance on MySpace indicates that if the facts in
SexSearch were different, and the plaintiff in the case was really Jane
Roe, the court would have still found SexSearch to be immune from suit.
SexSearch and MySpace stand for the same proposition: regardless of the
underlying facts of the suit, if the claims brought against a Web site seek
to hold it liable for failing to monitor the content provided by third
parties, then the Web site will be immune. While it is true that an adult
male is not the most sympathetic plaintiff in a suit against a sex Web site
seeking to hold it liable for his actions, the claims and underlying facts at
issue still implicate the sexual assault of a minor.
The district court in SexSearch went on to conduct an analysis of
the merits of each of the claims and found that regardless of the CDA
immunity, none of the claims stated a basis upon which relief could be
granted.105 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit upheld the dismissal of the
claims on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) grounds,106 but the
court did not address whether SexSearch was immune from suit under
the CDA.107 The Sixth Circuit stated that it did not adopt the lower
court’s analysis of immunity because the District Court “read § 230 more
broadly than any previous Court of Appeals decision has read it,
potentially abrogating all state- or common-law causes of action brought
against interactive Internet services.”108
B. Dart v. Craigslist, Inc.
In Dart v. Craigslist, Inc.,109 plaintiff, Sheriff Thomas Dart of the
Chicago Police Department, sought to hold Craigslist liable for the
contents of the “Erotic Services” portion of its Web site.110 Craigslist is a
Web site that publishes millions of classified advertisements for various
things, such as housing, jobs, dating, used items, and communication
information.111 The Web site is divided into categories and subcategories
established by Craigslist to help streamline its users’ interests.112 The
content of the ads and the selection of where to place their ads are
104

Doe v. SexSearch, 502 F. Supp. 2d 719, 727 (N.D. Ohio 2007).
Id. at 728–37.
106
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
107
Doe v. SexSearch.com, 551 F.3d 412, 415 (6th Cir. 2008).
108
Id. The Sixth Circuit did not elaborate on why the lower court had read the statute
so broadly and why it refused to affirm the lower court’s granting of immunity.
109
665 F. Supp. 2d 961, 961 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 962.
105
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provided by the users of the website.113 Users posting any content on the
Web site must agree to abide by Craigslist’s “Terms of Use.”114
Craigslist also provides a search engine that permits users to search
through ads using a word-search function.115 The area at issue in this
case was the subcategory of “services” within the “erotic” category (now
the “adult” category).116 Whenever users access this part of the Web site,
they receive an additional “warning & disclaimer” in which they must
agree to flag as “prohibited” any information that violates Craigslist’s
Terms of Use, including “offers for or the solicitation of prostitution.”117
In this case, the plaintiff, Thomas Dart, the sheriff of Cook County,
stated that prostitution is rampant on Craigslist and claimed that
Craigslist’s “Erotic Services” category serves as a public nuisance.118 To
support this claim, Dart alleged that Craigslist violates federal, state and
local prostitution laws by “solicit[ing] for a prostitute,” by “‘arranging’
meetings of persons for purposes of prostitution and ‘direct[ing]’ persons
to places of prostitution,” and by making it easier for prostitutes, pimps,
and patrons to conduct business.119
The court found that Craigslist was entitled to a dismissal based on
CDA immunity.120 The court held that Craigslist is an interactive
computer service,121 and it is not an information content provider with
regard to the illegal information.122 In addition, the court held that
plaintiff’s claims sought to hold Craigslist liable as the publisher or
speaker of information created by others.123 The court specifically
rejected the arguments that “Craigslist knowingly ‘arranges’ meetings for
the purpose of prostitution and ‘directs’ people to places of prostitution,”
and that Craigslist “provid[es] the contact information of prostitutes and
brothels.”124 Therefore, regardless of the underlying illegal content
Craigslist provided, the court precluded claims that the Web site should
be liable for its function as the publisher of the information.125 The court
further held that Craigslist does not induce users to post illegal material
113

Id.
Id.
Dart, 665 F. Supp. at 962.
116
Id. at 961–62.
117
Id. at 962.
118
Id. at 963. This case specifically concerns “chicago.craigslist.org,” one of the
region-specific webpages on Craigslist’s website.
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Id.
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Id. at 965–69.
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Dart, 665 F. Supp. at 965.
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Id. at 967–69.
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by providing an “adult services” section,126 stating that the word-search
function is a “neutral tool” also subject to immunity.127
In both of these cases, the courts used a broad interpretation of
immunity without considering the nature of the underlying Web sites and
the Web sites’ efforts to elicit dangerous and potentially illegal
information. The courts used the same tunnel vision to grant immunity
as the majority of the courts have used before them, instead of seeking to
tie the facts to the purpose behind the law. The Ninth Circuit
reconsidered this restricting outlook in Fair Housing v. Roommate.com,
LLC.
IV. ROOMMATE
A. Case Summary
The seminal case that represents a shift away from granting broad
immunity is Fair Housing v. Roommate.com, LLC.128 Plaintiffs, the Fair
Housing Council of San Fernando Valley and the Fair Housing Council
of San Diego, brought suit against Roommate.com for various violations
of the Fair Housing Act and California housing discrimination laws.129
Defendant Roommate.com runs a Web site “designed to match people
renting out spare rooms with people looking for a place to live.”130 To
use the Web site, individuals must create profiles by answering questions
provided by Roommate.com about themselves and their roommate
preferences, using pre-selected answers from a drop-down menu, and
writing in an optional “Additional Comments” section in which there are
no pre-selected answers and individuals can write anything they desire.131
The questions posed by the Web site ask about an individual’s sex,
familial status, sexual orientation, and about the user’s preferences in
regards to those characteristics.132 These questions must be answered as
a prerequisite to using the Web site.133 The Web site allows users to
search the listings by entering their preferences into a search engine that
returns listings that correspond to their preferences.134 The Web site
126

Id. at 967–69.
Dart, 665 F. Supp. at 969. (The court relied on the standard advanced by
Roommate, 521 F.3d 1157, that is further explained in Part IV.)
128
Fair Hous. Council v. Roommate.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (en
banc).
129
Id. at 1162.
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Id. at 1161.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Roommate, 521 F.3d at 1162.
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further provides an email service for which users must pay an additional
fee to receive periodic emails from Roommate.com; the emails suggest
available housing options that meet the users’ preferences.135
Plaintiffs brought suit under the Fair Housing Act and other state
laws pertaining to housing discrimination.136 Defendant contended that it
was immune from suit under the CDA.137 Plaintiffs conceded that
Roommate.com is an interactive computer service, establishing the first
element of immunity.138 The district court granted CDA immunity to
that defendant Roommate.com for all of the Fair Housing Act violations
and California housing discrimination violations alleged against it
because it was not an information content provider.139 The case was then
appealed and reviewed twice by the Ninth Circuit.140 In a panel decision,
the Ninth Circuit upheld only partial immunity for the Web site,141
though in an en banc decision, it found that Roommate.com was not
immune from suit for some of the violations alleged against it.142
In the panel decision, the court set forth a fragmented opinion on
what aspects of the website that Roommate.com was entitled to
immunity for.143 Judge Kozinski divided the analysis into three issues:
the questionnaires that users were forced to fill out; the completed users’
profiles; and the “Additional Comments” portion of the users’ profiles.144
In considering the first issue, all the judges agreed that Roommate.com
was an information content provider because it created the questions and
answer choices.145 The second issue—whether the users’ answers that
were published as their profiles were subject to CDA immunity—
provided a more difficult issue for the judges.146 The majority opined
that Roommate.com was not immune for the users’ profiles because it
actively solicited and processed them.147 The majority drew a distinction
between the facts in this case and the facts in Carafano by stating that the
Carafano court did not grant immunity “to those who actively
135

Id.
Id.
137
Id.
138
Id. at 1162, n.6.
139
Fair Hous. Council v. Roommate.com, LLC, No. 03-09386, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 27987 (Cent. D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2004).
140
Fair Hous. Council v. Roommate.com, LLC, 489 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2007); rev’d
en banc, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008).
141
Fair Hous. Council v. Roommate.com, LLC, 489 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2007).
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Roommate, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
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Fair Hous. Council v. Roommate.com, LLC, 489 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2007).
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Id.
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Id. at 926–27.
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Id. at 927–29.
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Id.
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encourage, solicit and profit from the tortious and unlawful
communication of others.”148 The majority further reasoned that by
providing a search mechanism and e-mail service, Roommate.com
provides an “additional layer of information that it is ‘responsible’ at
least ‘in part’ for creating or developing.”149 The majority, however,
found that Roommate.com was immune from liability for the content of
users’ “Additional Comments” sections.150 The court found that the
difference between the “Additional Comments” section and the rest of
the users’ profiles was that the “Additional Comments” section lacked
the specific encouragement by Roommate.com to provide discriminatory
information.151
Two judges dissented. One judge on the panel argued that the
majority had gone too far in stripping immunity from Roommate.com.
However, another judge argued that the majority had not gone far enough
and believed that Roommate.com should have been completely stripped
of immunity.152 Specifically, Judge Reinhardt dissented from the
majority in arguing that Roommate.com should not have been granted
immunity for the “Additional Comments” section; he believed that the
comments were an integral part of the discriminatory users’ profiles, and
the site actively solicited and encouraged individuals to post
discriminatory comments in that section.153 Judge Reinhardt looked at
the users’ profiles as a whole, in contrast to the majority that examined
each section of the profiles separately.154
Judge Ikuta concurred with the majority in granting immunity for
the “Additional Comments” section and dissented from the decision not
to grant immunity to Roommate.com for the content of the users’
profiles.155 She argued that the majority adopted an overly expansive
interpretation of “information content provider” unsupported by case
law, and that Roommate.com did not become an information content
provider by soliciting specific type of information.156
Five months later, the Ninth Circuit heard the case en banc. The
court upheld the panel’s findings that Roommate.com was an
information content provider with respect to the questions posed during

148
149
150
151
152
153
154
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Id. at 927–28.
Roommate, 489 F.3d at 929.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 930–35.
Id. at 930–33 (Reinhardt J., dissenting).
Id. at 931.
Roommate, 489 F.3d at 933–35.
Id. at 933–35.
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the registration process and the profiles created from those questions.157
The court reasoned that even though users are information content
providers in principle, that does not preclude Roommate.com or any
other interactive computer service from also being an information
content provider “by helping ‘develop’ at least ‘in part’ the information
in the profiles.”158 The court further stated that “Roommate is
‘responsible’ at least ‘in part’ for each subscriber’s profile page, because
every such page is a collaborative effort between Roommate and the
subscriber.”159
The court next considered Roommate.com’s search system and email notification system, holding that Roommate.com acted as an
information content provider with respect to both systems.160 The court
sought to define the term “develop,” which had not been analyzed in the
panel’s decision.161 The court carefully considered the language of the
statute and stated that “develop” must have an additional meaning other
than “create;” otherwise, the use of both words in the statute would have
been superfluous.162 The court set forth a definition of “develop” by
stating, “a website helps to develop unlawful content, and thus falls
within the exception to § 230, if it contributes materially to the alleged
illegality of the conduct.”163 By allowing users to search based on illegal
preferences and sending e-mails pursuant to these preferences,
Roommate.com was no longer a passive conduit, but instead a partial
“developer” of the information.164 The court stated, “[i]f Roommate.com
has no immunity for asking discriminatory questions, as we concluded
above, it can certainly have no immunity for using the answers to the
unlawful questions to limit who has access to housing.”165

157

Fair Hous. Council v. Roommate.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1164–67 (9th Cir.
2008) (en banc).
158
Id. at 1165. (The court stated that requiring subscribers to answer the questions as
a condition of using Roommate’s services unlawfully “cause[s]” subscribers to make a
“statement . . . with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates [a] preference,
limitation, or discrimination,” in violation of [the Fair Housing Act]. The CDA does not
grant immunity for inducing third parties to express illegal preferences.”) See also Batzel
v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1033 (9th Cir. 2003).
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Roommate, 521 F.3d at 1167.
160
Id. at 1167–72.
161
Id. at 1166–68.
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Id.; See also FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1198 (10th Cir. 2009).
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Roommate, 521 F.3d at 1168.
164
Id. at 1167.
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Id. (The court sought to distinguish the search engine at issue from generic search
engines, such as Google and Yahoo! because the search functions used by these search
engines do not “develop” the information sufficiently to meet the court’s announced
rule).
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The court then analyzed the “Additional Comments” section of
users’ profiles and upheld the panel’s decision that Roommate.com was
immune for that section.166 The court characterized the “Additional
Comments” as a neutral tool, which was fully protected by CDA
immunity.167 The court’s analysis of the “Additional Comments” section
focused on the proclaimed definition of “develop” set forth in the
decision.168
B. Case Analysis
The analysis of whether a Web site should qualify as an
information content provider, advanced in Roommate, is a step in the
right direction for adhering to Congress’s goals in passing the CDA.169
The decision does not affect Congress’s attempts to avoid disincentives
to self-police Web sites. Roommate.com contributed to the content of
the discriminatory information, and thus, this case did not present an
issue of self-policing material provided by other information content
providers.170 Furthermore, this decision does not affect the policy goal of
providing for the free flow of the Internet. Roommate portrays the
outward limits of allowing the free flow of the Internet.
The court creates a clear divide by drawing the line between the
profiles created through questions posed by Roommate.com, the e-mail
notification, and search system, on the one hand, and the “Additional
Comments” section, on the other. The court announced the rule that
whenever the Web-site helps to “develop,” at least “in part,” the illegal
information provided, it transforms from a passive conduit into a
responsible party that does not receive immunity.171 However, providing
a forum in which individuals can provide information on their own, such
as the “Additional Comments” section, does not pass this threshold
without some kind of active inducement of the supplied content.172
166

Id. at 1173–74.
Id. at 1174. (“Roommate publishes these comments as written . . . . [it] is not
responsible, in whole or in part, for the development of this content, which comes
entirely from subscribers and is passively displayed by Roommate.”)
168
Id.
169
Roommate, 521 F.3d at 1170, 1175.
170
Id. at 1170. (“Here, Roommate is not being sued for removing some harmful
messages while failing to remove others; instead, it is being sued for the predictable
consequences of creating a website designed to solicit and enforce housing preferences
that are alleged to be illegal.”)
171
Id. at 1166.
172
Id. at 1173–74. See also FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1199 (10th Cir.
2009) (This distinction can be more readily observable through the analogy, “[w]e would
not ordinarily say that one who builds a highway is ‘responsible’ for the use of that
highway by a fleeing bank robber, even though the culprit’s escape was facilitated by the
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The Ninth Circuit, in the en banc decision, also sought to explain
and distinguish previous case law to further develop its rule. In
considering the previous case of Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc.,173
the court affirmed the grant CDA immunity to the Web site while stating
that some of the case’s reasoning was incorrect.174 In Carafano, the
court granted immunity to a dating Web site that had published an
unauthorized profile created by an unknown party.175 The profile
contained an actress’s personal information, which led to threatening
phone calls.176 In Roommate, the court stated that the Carafano court
properly granted immunity because the dating Web site did not induce
the illegal content, but rather provided neutral tools to individuals who
independently created illegal content.177 However, the Carafano court
was incorrect in stating that “no [dating] profile has any content until a
user actively creates it,” and finding that a website may still be granted
immunity if it asked questions and provided drop down answers that then
created users’ profiles.178 The Ninth Circuit stated in Roommate that
“even if the data [is] supplied by third parties, a Web site operator may
still contribute to the content’s illegality and thus be liable as a
developer.”179
The analysis set forth in Roommate considers the amount of control
and input an interactive service provider has in creating information.
The Ninth Circuit created a sliding scale to determine how much
information a Web site can solicit before losing immunity. The
Roommate decision is a good example of a court considering the facts
and claims at issue in the case, as opposed to blindly granting broad
immunity.
Since the decision in Roommate, many courts have followed the
Ninth Circuit’s reasoning,180 but some courts have rejected Roommate as
too expansive or have misapplied the reasoning.181 The mixed reception
availability of the highway.” Therefore, merely because the existence of illegal content
was facilitated by the presence of a neutral conduit, that is not enough to hold that
conduit responsible for “development” of information.)
173
339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003).
174
Roommate, 521 F.3d at 1171–72.
175
Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1121, 1125.
176
Id. at 1121–22.
177
Roommate, 521 F.3d at 1171–72.
178
Id.
179
Id. at 1171.
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FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1198–1200 (10th Cir. 2009); Goddard v.
Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1196–1201 (N.D. Cal. 2009); Certain Approval
Programs, L.L.C. v. Xcentric Ventures, L.L.C., No. CV08-1608-PHX-NVW, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 22318 at *5–6 (D. Ariz. Mar. 9, 2009).
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See Doe v. SexSearch, 502 F. Supp. 2d 719, 725 (N.D. Ohio 2007). (SexSearch
was decided after the initial Ninth Circuit ruling in Roommate and the court in SexSearch
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of Roommate by courts is interesting when the interpretation of the CDA
is traced back to Zeran v. AOL, the seminal case on the subject.182 The
Fourth Circuit merely sought to define the traditional jobs of a publisher
that the CDA intended to immunize, and to set forth the proposition that
whether a Web site would be considered a distributor or a publisher at
common law, that distinction is immaterial under the CDA, as both
would be immunized for doing the traditional jobs of a publisher.183
Following that interpretation, the Ninth Circuit did not grant
Roommate.com immunity because it actively created users’ profiles and
solicited discriminatory information that led to alleged violations of the
Fair Housing Act and California’s anti-discrimination laws.184
Roommate.com was not a neutral conduit, but rather an information
content provider itself because it helped develop the allegedly
discriminatory information.185
V. PROPOSED TEST
A. Introduction of New Test
A more comprehensive test is needed that will work in conjunction
with the Roommate reasoning, and expand upon that analysis in order to
halt the dissemination of sweeping immunity. The appropriate test
should utilize the Roommate standard when determining whether an
entity is an information content provider, and a new test should be
adopted to ensure that the claims at issue fall within the ambit of the
CDA, so as to grant immunity to Web sites for these claims. Under the
proposed test, the court should consider the collective effect of the nature
of the interactive computer service, the claim(s) at issue, and the
underlying facts alleged.186 This new test will build upon the test
relied on the analysis of Carafano instead of Roommate, which may have been one of the
reasons why the Circuit refused to consider the district court’s holding granting CDA
immunity.). See also Dart v. Craigslist, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 961, 968–69 (N.D. Ill. 2009)
(Dart was decided after the en banc ruling in Roommate and actually used Roommate as
precedent in the opinion to draw a comparison between the open-ended “Additional
Comments” sections in Roommate and the structure of Craigslist’s service, providing
categories and subcategories. The court found that the aforementioned aspects of the
website were akin to one another. The court further found that the word search tool
provided by Craigslist was a “neutral tool” under the reasoning of Roommate.).
182
Zeran v. America Online, 129 F.3d 327(4th Cir. 1997).
183
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330–34.
184
Roommate, 521 F.3d at 1164–68.
185
Id.
186
See Doe v. SexSearch.com, 551 F.3d 412, 415 (6th Cir. 2008). The implementation
of this test is somewhat supported by the Circuit court in SexSearch. Although the Circuit
court did not rule on whether SexSearch would be immune from suit under the
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advanced in Roommate that looked for Web sites that help “to develop
unlawful content” and to “contribute materially to the alleged illegality
of the conduct.”187 More importantly, this test will place the Roommate
inquiry into the larger scheme of promoting use of the Internet, while
setting some important guidelines.
B. Elements of the Test
1. The Nature of the Interactive Computer Service
The cases concerning CDA immunity have presented a vast array of
Web sites that target different types of people and activities.188 Some are
Web sites that many would consider to be harmless, whereas some, such
as SexSearch and the “Erotic Services”189 section of Craigslist, are
sexually explicit Web sites that facilitate prostitution and the exploitation
of minors. Courts should consider the nature of a specific Web site as
one factor when determining whether to grant immunity for a specific
claim, because different societal concerns flow from different Web sites.
This part of the analysis should determine whether or not the Web
site at issue is solely an interactive computer service provider or both an
interactive computer service provider and an information content
provider based on the Roommate test. However, the test should be
altered somewhat to allow for a broader definition of information content
provider for Web sites that encourage illegal or risky behavior and could
easily lead to such behavior based upon the information asked for by the
Web site. The content of the material requested by the Web site would
thus pose a higher burden on Web sites such as SexSearch and the

Communications Decency Act, it did say that it refused to accept the district court’s
analysis of the CDA because it “would read § 230 more broadly than any previous Court
of Appeals decision has read it, potentially abrogating all state- or common-law causes of
action brought against interactive Internet services.” The Circuit Court suggests that the
district court should have provided a more thorough analysis into the type of claim set
forth.
187
Roommate, 521 F.3d at 1168.
188
See, e.g., Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008) (involving MySpace,
a social networking website that seeks to build friendships); Universal Commc’n Sys. v.
Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413 (1st Cir. 2007) (involving a website that lists stock prices and
has a message board that conveys financial information); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com,
Inc., 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003) (involving Matchmaker.com, a commercial Internet
dating service); Green v. Am. Online, 318 F.3d 465 (3d Cir. 2003) (involving an AOL
chatroom); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) (involving an AOL
bulletin board); Anthony v. Yahoo! Inc., 421 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (N.D. Cal. 2006)
(involving a portion of Yahoo! dedicated to dating).
189
Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d at 963 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (Craigslist has
changed the name from “Erotic Services” to “Adult Services.”).
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“Erotic Services” section of Craigslist because of the overarching policy
concerns that stem from sexually related Web sites.
The imposition of a higher burden on sexually related Web sites is
likely to be met with First Amendment concerns. For example,
SexSearch would argue that although its Web site may be unsavory, it is
completely lawful when used by consenting adults and as such, holding
the Web site to a higher burden violates the Constitution. However, this
higher burden would only be applied when the court considers the nature
of the Web site, along with the underlying facts and claims at issue, and
the balancing as a whole calls for a higher burden. In SexSearch, the
plaintiff was suing the Web site for allowing minors to access the Web
site and participate in active sex solicitations.190 The claim was not
attacking the nature of the Web site generally, but rather focusing on the
specific concerns involving the nature of the website when used by
minors.191 In a case concerning consenting adults, such as a defamation
claim against SexSearch, the higher burden would not be imposed on the
Web site because the underlying facts and claims do not demand such a
burden. Therefore, a heightened burden would only be applied in a small
amount of cases, where sexually natured Web sites are not instilling the
safety of their Web sites. This test is thus sufficiently narrowly tailored
to avoid the curtailment of free speech while promoting other important
societal interests.192
2. The Claims Alleged and Their Underlying Facts
The second part of the analysis should focus on the claims brought
by plaintiff. Based on prior case law, if the claims relate a Web site’s
alleged security, the court should not generally hold Web sites liable for
their actions if they are trying to self-police or work as a publisher.
Security in this context refers to Web sites proclaiming that they will
ensure that their users abide by all the rules implemented by them. This
expansive protection given to Web sites has been stretched too far and
needs to be subject to one main limitation. Courts should hold that if the
Web site proclaims that it will police its material, and it fails to provide
such security, then it should be held responsible for those
190

Doe v. SexSearch.com, 502 F. Supp. 2d 719, 723–24 (N.D. Ohio 2007).
Id.
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Compare U.S. v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803, 803 (2000) (The Court
found that 47 U.S.C.S. § 561 violated the First Amendment because it was not the least
restrictive alternative available. The statute required cable operators to either fully block
channels reserved for adult programming or to “time channel” the programming, limiting
the transmission to hours when children were unlikely to be viewing. The Court found
that there was a less restrictive alternative, to allow viewers to order signal blocking on a
household-by-household basis.)
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representations. Otherwise, this amounts to a misrepresentation by the
Web site that encourages users to trust and rely upon the Web sites’
representations. Under this proposed limitation, Web sites are still
encouraged to self-police. However, Web sites are not encouraged to tell
their users that they are self-policing, when in fact they are not policing
at all or are doing so in a negligent fashion.
Advocates of the broad interpretation of the CDA would likely
consider this part of the proposed test to be a revival of the distinction
between publisher and distributor liability at common law.193 Although
this part of the test does limit the representations of Web sites to actually
be grounded in the actions they undertake to self-police their Web sites,
it does not completely revert the state of the law to that of a pre-CDA
society. Rather, it “revives” the holding in Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v.
Prodigy Services Co. and applies it in a very narrow context.194 The
Stratton court held that a Web site representing itself as self-policed was
responsible for its content.195 This proposition would only be applied
when the other two elements of the proposed test are met—when the
nature of the website is dangerous, and the underlying events and facts
are so heinous as to call for heightened scrutiny of the Web site’s
representations. Under the proposed test, the limited use of the Stratton
holding would not require a court to find a Web site liable based on the
facts in Stratton: the plaintiffs brought suit against Prodigy because a
third party had posted defamatory statements about the plaintiffs’
business and personal motives.196 Using the proposed test, Prodigy
would be found immune from suit despite its representations ensuring the
safety of its Web site because the facts and underlying claims of the case
do not mandate a heightened level of scrutiny. On the other hand,
SexSearch and Dart mandate a heightened level of scrutiny because of
their security misrepresentations, the egregious underlying facts and
claims in the cases, and the nature of their Web site.
Furthermore, the revival of Stratton’s holding is permissible
because at the time it was abrogated by the CDA, the CDA sought to
promote the growth of the Internet above all other costs.197 Today, as the
Internet has flourished exponentially, that policy concern must be
weighed against the other policy concerns of sexual exploitation of
193

See, e.g., Huycke, supra note 37, at 583–84.
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 21063/94, 1995 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 229 at *6–11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
195
Id. at *10-11.
196
Id. at *1-2.
197
47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1), (2) (2009); see also Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027–
28 (9th Cir. 2003); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330–31 (4th Cir. 1997).
Parenthical explanation of relevance of these cases?
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minors and prostitution.198 Although the balancing of these policy
interests may be more suited for Congress, the courts can no languish as
more atrocious scenarios unfold from the lack of accountability held by
Web sites. The courts must use judicial interpretation to reconcile the
CDA with other pieces of legislation from Congress, regarding issues
such as the sexual exploitation of minors and prostitution. Therefore, the
use of the holding in Stratton is so narrow that it should not be
considered Stratton’s revival, but rather a necessary utilization of old
legal principles applied to effectuate important policy considerations in a
new and more dangerous world.
This suggested limitation would seek to abolish the arbitrary line
drawn in Mazur v. eBay, in which the court held that eBay was immune
from some of its representations to its users, but not for others.199 In that
case, the district court held that eBay was immune regarding its site’s
representations , which stated that it used “reputable” auction houses and
screened them before using them.200 The court explained that these
assertions were akin to a traditional publisher’s role because deciding
whether to include a live auction house when screening is similar to
deciding whether to publish.201 In contrast, the court held that eBay’s
affirmative representations that the Web site was “safe” may still be
actionable.202 The court reasoned that eBay made the statements that the
Web site was “safe” of its own volition, without using any comments or
feedback provided by users.203 As such, the court found that eBay was
the speaker of those statements.204 The court’s distinction between the
plaintiff’s two claims turned on semantics and thereby exhibits the need
to hold Web sites liable when they make affirmative representations
about their own safety features. The holding from this case potentially
provides confusion when applying it to different sets of facts.205
198
Fair Hous. Council v. Roommate.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1164, n.15 (9th Cir.
2008) (en banc).
199
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16561 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2008).
200
Id. at *28–30.
201
Id. at *28–29.
202
Id. at *29–33 (The court further stated that the statements that eBay included in its
Live Auction User Agreement were not enough to overcome this representation of safety.
These statements included that eBay “1) only provides a venue; 2) is not involved in the
actual transaction between buyer and seller; and 3) does not guarantee any of the goods
offered in any auction. Specifically, eBay is ‘solely a passive conduit’ and ‘not an auction
house,’ it is ‘not conducting the live auctions’ and it does not have control over the
‘quality, safety or legality of the items advertised.’”).
203
Id.
204
Id.
205
See Mazur, 2008 U.S. Dist LEXIS 16561 at *34–35. (The confusion of this
holding is exemplified in the Mazur court’s characterization of SexSearch. When
analyzing whether the affirmative representations made by eBay should be actionable, the
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When considering the claims at issue, the court should also analyze
the underlying facts that support those claims. In the majority of the
cases in which courts have granted CDA immunity, the defendant was
sued for tort claims such as defamation or libel, with the underlying facts
alleging that the Web site should be held responsible for the injurious
content provided by another.206 The application of CDA immunity in
reference to cases involving underlying facts like fulfills congressional
intent because those cases sought to hold an interactive computer service
liable as a publisher or speaker of the claims. However, Congress did
not intend to allow Web sites immunity from all suits based on all kinds
of underlying facts, no matter how egregious. This intent can be gleaned
from specific statements within the CDA. First, Congress only meant for
immunity to be extended when interactive computer services were being
treated as “publishers” or “speakers” of third party information.207
Congress did not intend to immunize Web sites for all of their activities,
including serving as gatekeepers responsible for ensuring the safety of
their Web sites and the truthfulness of their own assertions.
Second, Congress has explicitly stated that CDA immunity should
not be extended to alleged violations of criminal law.208 Although this
exception to CDA immunity is included to prevent the granting of
immunity when a Web site faces criminal charges, the policy behind the
exception should be interpreted broadly. The policy should be read so
that courts should not grant immunity when a Web site actively
participates in a criminal wrong. Specifically, the statute enumerates
crimes related to obscenity and the sexual exploitation of children.209
court distinguished this case from SexSearch. The court said that the granting of
immunity in SexSearch was not applicable here for three reasons. First, the court
reasoned that in SexSearch, defendant’s statements about its users were a regurgitation of
its users’ representations. Second, the court noted that in Mazur, eBay did not present
evidence of safety assurances that it received from HJA, whereas SexSearch presented
the Terms of Conditions that stated that SexSearch was not liable for third party content.
Finally, the court set forth that the plaintiff in SexSearch knew of the safeguards that the
website provided, whereas the plaintiff in this case did not. However the court’s analysis
was a mischaracterization because in both cases, the statements about defendant’s
website were related to the information provided by the website’s users, there were
Terms and Conditions agreements in both cases where the defendant’sWeb sites
disclaimed liability, and in both cases, the plaintiffs knew of the safeguards of the
website.)
206
See, e.g., Universal Commn’c Sys. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413 (1st Cir. 2007)
(suing for defamation); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003) (suing for
defamation); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003) (suing for
defamation); Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. Am. Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980 (10th Cir.
2000) (suing for defamation and negligence).
207
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2009).
208
47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1) (2009).
209
Id.
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Therefore, sexually related crimes should be held to a heightened burden
when seeking immunity. Congress has made numerous efforts to prevent
such crimes from occurring through the Internet, and those efforts should
be considered when courts determine whether to grant Web sites
immunity.210 This test seeks to place more responsibility on interactive
computer services that are being sued based on crimes of a sexual nature.
C. Application of the Test
1. Interactive Service Provider
The natures of SexSearch and the “Erotic Services” section of
Craigslist require the use of heightened scrutiny when seeking to apply
CDA immunity. SexSearch is a Web site that offers an online adult
dating service.211 The main goal of SexSearch is for its users to meet one
another and engage in sexual acts.212 The outcome that SexSearch seeks
is more dangerous than the outcome from other social networking sites
that courts have compared it to, such as Yahoo! Personals and Yahoo!
Premier,213 MySpace,214 or Matchmaker.215 In Doe v. SexSearch, the
court barred as immune the assertion that defendant should be liable
because a minor was permitted to be on its Web site.216 The court
analogized the claim in SexSearch to the claim in Doe v. MySpace, in
which the court held that arguing for failure to implement safety
procedures for minors really meant that plaintiff was seeking to hold
MySpace liable for its actions as a publisher of third party information.217

210

The statutory history of Congress’s attempts to help curb the sexual exploitations
of minors on the internet is outside the scope of this note. See John Nisbett, Comment,
Checkmate: How Sexual Predators in (Your)Space Have Strategically Employed Existing
Cyber-Laws to Outflank Their Prey, 28 MISS. C. L. REV. 181, 191–96 (2009) (outlining
the history of Congress’s initiative.); Sandra J.C. van der Heide, Note, Social Networking
and Sexual Predators: The Case of Self-Regulation, 31 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 173,
183–86 (2008) (explaining COPA and Deleting Online Predators Act of 2007
(“DOPA”)); Groppe, supra note 13, at 229–37 (outlining the statutes that have been
passed and the pending statutes.).
211
Doe v. SexSearch, 502 F. Supp. 2d 719, 722 (N.D. Ohio 2007).
212
Id.
213
Id. at 725 (The court compared the facts of this case to the facts in Anthony v.
Yahoo! Inc., 421 F. Supp. 2d. 1257 (N.D. Cal. 2006), which involved a section of Yahoo!
that served as a dating service.).
214
Id. at 727 (The court compared the facts of this case to the facts in Doe v.
MySpace, 474 F. Supp. 2d. 843, 849 (W.D. Tex. 2007).).
215
Id. at 725–26. (The court also compared the facts of this case to the facts in
Carafano v. Metrosplash, 339 F. 3d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003).).
216
Id. at 727–28.
217
Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 849–50 (W.D. Tex. 2007).
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Although the two claims are similar, the distinction that can be
drawn between them is the difference between the Web sites at issue.
MySpace is a social networking website that allows users to create
profiles, which include personal information and information about their
lives and their interests.218 MySpace allows users to extend “friend
invitations” to other users and to communicate with them.219 The basic
idea behind MySpace is to allow users to build friendships.220 This idea
runs counter to the idea behind SexSearch. Although both Web sites
could be termed “social networking sites,”221 the social networking
intended to occur on MySpace varies greatly from that activities intended
to occur via SexSearch; the former provides a platform for seeking
friendships while the latter encourages people to seek sex.222 The Web
sites’ respective age requirements further illustrate the distinction
between their natures: while MySpace conditions membership on
individuals being fourteen years-old or older, SexSearch mandates that
users are eighteen years or older.223 If these restrictions were enforced
and only adults were present on the Web site, then the activities of
SexSearch would be entirely legal.
The interactive computer service in Dart is of a similar nature to the
one in SexSearch. The interactive computer service in Dart is a
subcategory of Craigslist, “Erotic Services.”224 Plaintiff, Sheriff Dart,
argued that this section of the Web site induced individuals to post
listings advertising prostitution.225 In support of his claim, he provided
statistics of how many arrests were effectuated from content posted on
Craigslist, and he submitted examples of some of the advertisements
found.226 Craigslist countered this argument by citing various services
covered by the “Erotic Services” category that did not implicate
prostitution.227

218

Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 415 (5th Cir. 2008).
Id.
220
Id. at 415–16.
221
MySpace, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 845–46 (“The idea of online social networking is that
members will use their online profiles to become part of an online community of people
with common interests.”).
222
MySpace, 528 F.3d at 415–16; Doe v. SexSearch, 502 F. Supp. 2d 719, 722 (N.D.
Ohio 2007).
223
MySpace, 528 F. 3d at 416; SexSearch, 502 F. Supp. 2d at 723.
224
Dart v. Craigslist, 665 F. Supp. 2d 961, 961 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (The name of the
subsection was later changed to “Adult Services.”).
225
Id. at 962.
226
Id. at 962–63.
227
Dart v. Craigslist, 665 F. Supp. 2d 961 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (stating that the “Erotic
Services” section included advertisements for “legal escort services, massage workers,
[and] exotic dancers”).
219
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The dangerousness of this section of Craigslist is not a secret. On
April 14, 2009, the peril of the website became public when the
“Craigslist killer” murdered a young woman named Julissa Brisman.228
The killer met up with Brisman in response to a masseuse advertisement
she placed within Craigslist’s “Erotic Services” category.229 For a few
years prior to Brisman’s murder, many attorneys general were fighting
Craigslist to implement more effective safety procedures.230 Although
Craigslist installed some rudimentary safety procedures to appease the
attorneys general, such procedures were not sufficient to prevent
Brisman’s murder.231 After the murder, Craigslist changed the name of
the “Erotic Services” category to “Adult Services” within the United
States.232 Craigslist Chief Executive Officer Jim Buckmaster also
claimed that the postings in that category undergo consistent manual
review.233 Despite Buckmaster’s claims, many skeptics argue that the
“Adult Services” section provides a forum for the exact same type of
content that existed within the “Erotic Services” section.234 The
dangerousness of this section is demonstrated by a horrific murder, and
the safety procedures that have been installed fail to deter the sexual
exploitation and prostitution that is still occurs. Despite the fact that
Brisman was intentionally advertising sexual services on the Web site,
Craigslist still should have intervened and prevented the solicitation of
sexual services on its Web site.
This portion of the Web site is similar to SexSearch in promoting
sexually dangerous activities. Although there may be some legal
advertisements posted under this section, the title of the section implies
the existence of illicit material. This category can be distinguished from
other categories on the Web site,235 based on the type of content included
228

Maureen Orth, Killer @ Craigslist, VANITY FAIR, Oct. 2009 at 156; Aaron C.
Davis, Craigslist Vows to Improve Monitoring of ‘Adult’ Ads, WASH. POST, May 14,
2009, at A03.
229
Orth, supra note 224 at 156; Davis, supra note 224 at A03.
230
Id.
231
Id. (In November 2008, “the attorneys general got Craigslist to toughen its rules by
requiring a working landline or proper cell phone, a valid credit card, an e-mail address,
and an I.P. address that can be traced back to the individual from everyone placing a
posting on Erotic Services.”)
232
Id.; Brad Stone, Craigslist to Remove ‘Erotic’ Ads, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2009 at 1;
Davis, supra note 224.
233
Orth, supra note 224; Stone, supra note 228; Davis, supra note 224.
234
Orth, supra note 224; Davis, supra note 224 (Inspector Brian Bray, who oversees
the D.C. police department’s prostitution unit said “I believe it’ll just transfer [the
prostitution postings] over under a different name.”)
235
Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 961 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (listing other
examples of Craigslist’s categories and subcategories as “community,” “personals,”
“discussion forums,” “housing,” “for sale,” “services,” and “jobs.”).
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in each category and the connotations surrounding the categories. Like
SexSearch, the subcategory of “Erotic Services” requires that an
individual must be eighteen years-old to use the service, further
exhibiting the adult nature of the website.236 Because of the foreseeable
content of the information available under “Erotic Services” and the
foreseeable behavior that will result from interactions on SexSearch, the
courts should hold these Web sites to a higher burden in order to qualify
for CDA immunity.
In addition to considering the nature of the Web site, the court
should also look at the amount of development and solicitation of
information that the Web site engaged in. Under the proposed test, the
courts should be more willing to characterize SexSearch and Craigslist as
information content providers. Using the Roommates standard, it can be
argued that both of these Web sites have solicited the information
provided by third parties. The layout of each of these Web sites falls
somewhere on the Roomates sliding scale between the users’ profiles and
the “Additional Comments” section of Roommates.com.237 Although the
Web sites did not create discriminatory question and answer choices as
Roommates.com did, the purpose of each of these Web sites encouraged
individuals to provide information that would lead to sexual relations,
whether consensual or not.238 The formats of SexSearch and Craigslist
lend themselves less toward granting immunity than does the “Additional
Comments” section of Roommates.com because of the kind of
information solicited. The “Additional Comments” section sought any
other pertinent information that a roommate may want to provide about
housing options, whereas the Web sites at issue sought information about
“Erotic Services” and meeting offline to engage in sexual relations.239
Looking merely at the type of information solicited and the purposes
behind acquiring that information, a court should find that there was
more active solicitation and encouragement from SexSearch and
Craigslist than from Roommates.com regarding its “Additional
Comments” section.

236

Craigslist, http://chicago.craigslist.org/ (follow “Adult” hyperlink under the
“Services” category). (last visited __)
237
Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1164–74 (9th Cir.
2008).
238
Dart, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 961–62; Doe v. SexSearch, 502 F. Supp. 2d 719, 722
(N.D. Ohio 2007).
239
Compare Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1173, with Dart 665 F. Supp. 2d at 961–62;
SexSearch, 502 F. Supp. 2d at 722.
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2. The Claims and the Underlying Facts
The claims in SexSearch and Dart warrant a heightened burden to
receive immunity. In SexSearch, the relevant claims240 could be boiled
down to the failure of the website to monitor and exclude minors from
becoming members.241 Plaintiff’s claims did not center on treating
SexSearch as a publisher, but rather on the misrepresentations that
SexSearch engaged in through allowing minors to be present on the
website.242
In Dart, the claim alleged was public nuisance, but it was
ultimately based on Craigslist soliciting and facilitating prostitution.243
These failure-to-monitor and solicitation/facilitation claims occurred in
both cases despite the mechanisms in place to ensure that users of the
Web sites were at least eighteen years-old.244 SexSearch and Craigslist
represented to its users that the Web sites were free from minors and

240
SexSearch, 502 F. Supp. 2d. at 723–24 (relevant claims include breach of contract,
fraud, negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligent misrepresentation, failure to
warn, and deceptive trade practice and unfair and deceptive acts in violation of the Ohio
Consumer Sales Practices Act).
241
Id. at 724.
242
See Doe v. SexSearch, 2007 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions 604, 2-5 (N.D. Ohio May 18,
2007). SexSearch can be analogized to Anthony v. Yahoo!, 421 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1259–
60 (N.D. Cal. 2006), in which Yahoo! operated a dating website that was alleged to have
engaged in fraud. Plaintiff claimed that Yahoo! created false profiles of individuals and
additionally, sent profiles of actual subscribers who were no longer members to other
users to entice them to continue their subscriptions. Anthony, 421 F. Supp. 2d at 1259–60.
In SexSearch, the court considered plaintiff’s reliance on Anthony and rejected it because
the claims at issue did not center on fraudulent profiles that were created by the
interactive service provider. SexSearch, 502 F. Supp. 2d at 725. The SexSearch court,
however, did not address the second holding in Anthony, that CDA immunity was
unavailable for Yahoo!’s use of the profiles of former users because “Yahoo!’s manner of
presenting the profiles – not the underlying profiles themselves – constitute[d] fraud.”
Anthony, 421 F. Supp. 2d at 1263. Although the facts are somewhat different, the
rationale from Anthony about the former members’ profiles can be imputed to SexSearch.
In SexSearch, plaintiff sought to impose liability on SexSearch based on its
accompanying misrepresentations of age and the way in which SexSearch presented the
profiles – that all of its users were at least 18 years old.
243
Dart, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 963.
244
Id. at 961–62 (users posting on the Craigslist website under any category must
agree to abide by the “Terms and Conditions” which prohibit posting unlawful content.
Users posting in the “Erotic” category also receive an additional “warning and
disclaimer” stating that users agree to report any illegal content that they find with the
section, including the “solicitation of prostitution”); see also Craigslist,
http://chicago.craigslist.org/ (follow “Adult” hyperlink under the “Services” category)
(requiring users to represent that they are at least 18 years old.); SexSearch, 502 F. Supp.
2d at 723 (users posting on SexSearch must agree to the Terms and Conditions and the
profile guidelines, which indicate that all persons are 18 years or older. Users are also
required to check a box affirming that they are at least 18 years old).
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prostitution, respectively, and thus, the Web sites should be held to those
representations.
Although the specific claims brought against each Web site may
seem like other cases in which courts have granted immunity to
interactive computer services, the claims in SexSearch and Dart can be
distinguished from the majority of these cases based on their underlying
facts. SexSearch and Dart are both based on criminal wrongs—statutory
rape and prostitution, respectively245—as opposed to the numerous cases
that have dealt with civil wrongs, such as defamation and libel.
Furthermore, it is immaterial that the plaintiff in SexSearch was an adult
male who sued SexSearch after engaging in sexual relations with a minor
female. The plaintiff’s claims were still based on an exploitation of a
minor that occurred as a result of the representations of SexSearch. This
case could have easily been flipped around with the female suing the
Web site, and based on the reasoning of the SexSearch court, her claims
would have also failed. Therefore, the policy reasons behind holding
Web sites to a higher standard when criminal wrongs are alleged are
enormous. Specifically, the importance of curbing sexual crimes calls
for imposing a heightened burden on Web sites that are accused of
facilitating these criminal wrongs.246
The proposed test essentially boils down to considering all the facts
presented and balancing different public policies and societal goals. In
the case of sexually related Web sites, such as SexSearch and Craigslist’s
“Erotic Services” category, the potential danger that stems from the
information solicited by these Web sites is enormous. In considering the
nature of these Web sites, the claims at issue, and the underlying facts,
the courts should have applied a less rigid test; they should have
ultimately determined that SexSearch and the “Erotic Services” category
of Craigslist are information content providers and thus, not entitled to
immunity for the claims brought against them.
VI. CONCLUSION
Since the inception of the CDA, courts have sought to apply §
230(c)(1) broadly to grant immunity to a Web site whenever a Web site
merely portrayed content provided by a third party. When the CDA was
passed, this attitude towards broad immunity was appropriate, but over
the years, as the Internet has expanded exponentially, the idea of broad
immunity seems to be less necessary. Regardless of this lack of
245
246

13s.

SexSearch, 502 F. Supp. at 721; Dart, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 962–63.
See Nisbett, supra note 206; van der Heide, supra note 206; Groppe, supra note
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necessity, most courts are still blindly implementing the concept of
robust immunity. There has been a backlash though, through a few court
cases and some scholarly dissent. Roommate served as the seminal case
that could stand for the potential downfall of the CDA immunity
stronghold.
Specifically, SexSearch and Dart have exhibited the need to reform
the application of CDA immunity, at least in reference to Web sites and
claims of a sexual nature. This need can be satisfied by extending the
principles announced in Roommate through a fact intensive inquiry that
creates a higher threshold for Web sites to meet in order to avoid being
considered information content providers. This approach will in effect
make obtaining immunity for Web sites of a sexually explicit or
dangerous nature more difficult depending on the claims and facts
alleged, but will leave more generic Web sites with the same outcome as
they would have received before this test was created. This approach
will also make acquiring immunity more difficult if the claims and
underlying facts are based on criminal wrongs or wrongs associated with
misrepresentations by Web sites. However, the truly passive interactive
computer services should survive this new test unscathed. All claims are
not created equal and therefore should not be treated equally.
A fact intensive analysis is necessary to obtain just results in every
case that seeks to invoke the CDA. This analysis will consider the nature
of the website, the claims, and the underlying facts together to determine
what level of scrutiny should be applied. This test will likely end the
“lawless” nature of the Internet and instill more order into an area where
the courts seem to have followed blindly and unintentionally expanded
immunity, one case at a time.

